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Social Cognition

Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Also called: prisoner's dilemma game, iterated prisoner's dilemma

Measure cooperation over time: participants choose A or B in each round against one programmed partner, scored by how often they cooperate and how they answer the partner's choices.

3-5 minUntimed

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Papers, 2021 to 2025
865
Evidence grade
C
Registered clinical studies
3
How these are counted
Both A3 and 3
You A, partner B0 and 5
You B, partner A5 and 0
Both B1 and 1
Choose A
Choose B
You chose A and your partner chose A.
Cooperation rateReply to the partner
Choose A or B each round with the same partner
  • Overview
  • Evidence
  • Task design
  • Quality checks
  • Settings
  • Cite
  • Questions

What it measures

Measures cooperation over time: in repeated rounds, the participant and a programmed partner each choose to cooperate or defect, where defecting pays more in any one round but mutual cooperation pays more than mutual defection.

Constructs

  • Cooperation
  • Reciprocity
  • Social preferences
  • Social decision making

Research uses

  • Behavioral economics research
  • Cooperation and reciprocity studies
  • Social decision-making research in clinical groups
  • Within-study group comparison

How the paradigm works

The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma measures cooperation over time. In each round the participant and a partner each choose one of two options at the same time. If both cooperate, each gets 3 points; if both defect, each gets 1; if one defects while the other cooperates, the defector gets 5 and the cooperator nothing. Defecting pays more in any single round, but mutual cooperation pays more than mutual defection, so each round sets a short-term gain against cooperation. The partner is a computer program that follows set rules, and by default the instructions say so.

More about the paradigm

The task follows the iterated game of Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), with Axelrod's points of 5, 3, 1 and 0. The participant plays 20 rounds as standard against one partner that plays tit for tat: it cooperates in the first round, then repeats the participant's choice from the round before. The number of rounds is not shown, so no round is known to be the last. The options are labelled A and B, and which letter is cooperation is drawn from the session's seed. A comprehension question with feedback comes first, and both choices and the points show after each round. Researchers can set 5 to 50 rounds, show the number of rounds, choose a partner that always cooperates, always defects or chooses at random, use a neutral partner wording, and choose the payment line.

Scores

Cooperation Rate%
Share of rounds in which the participant cooperated.
Higher means more cooperation
First-Round Cooperation0/1
1 when the participant cooperated in the first round, 0 when not.
Informational
Cooperation After Partner Cooperated%
Share of rounds after the partner cooperated in which the participant cooperated.
Higher means cooperation was returned more often
Cooperation After Partner Defected%
Share of rounds after the partner defected in which the participant cooperated.
Higher means more cooperation after a defection
Total Pointspoints
Points the participant earned over all rounds.
Informational
Comprehension Check%
Share of the comprehension questions answered correctly.
1 supports interpretation

Use and evidence

865 papers from 2021 to 2025 name this task in their title or abstract, down 2% compared with 2016 to 2020. That ranks it 30 of 395 test families in our census. See the counts for every test.

2021 to 2025, the years gradedEarlier years
Papers per year naming the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, 2000 to 2025Bar chart. 2021: 178; 2022: 154; 2023: 177; 2024: 184; 2025: 172 papers. Peak year 2013.01002003002000: 73 papers2001: 66 papers2002: 91 papers2003: 69 papers2004: 91 papers2005: 111 papers2006: 143 papers2007: 132 papers2008: 132 papers2009: 183 papers2010: 179 papers2011: 200 papers2012: 186 papers2013: 213 papers2014: 185 papers2015: 199 papers2016: 188 papers2017: 172 papers2018: 183 papers2019: 171 papers2020: 173 papers2021: 178 papers2022: 154 papers2023: 177 papers2024: 184 papers2025: 172 papers200020052010201520202025
Papers per year naming the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, 2000 to 2025Bar chart. 2021: 178; 2022: 154; 2023: 177; 2024: 184; 2025: 172 papers. Peak year 2013.01002003002000: 73 papers2001: 66 papers2002: 91 papers2003: 69 papers2004: 91 papers2005: 111 papers2006: 143 papers2007: 132 papers2008: 132 papers2009: 183 papers2010: 179 papers2011: 200 papers2012: 186 papers2013: 213 papers2014: 185 papers2015: 199 papers2016: 188 papers2017: 172 papers2018: 183 papers2019: 171 papers2020: 173 papers2021: 178 papers2022: 154 papers2023: 177 papers2024: 184 papers2025: 172 papers200020052010201520202025
Papers per year whose title or abstract names this task (OpenAlex).
Show the numbers
YearPapers
2025172
2024184
2023177
2022154
2021178
2020173
2019171
2018183
2017172
2016188
2015199
2014185
2013213
2012186
2011200
2010179
2009183
2008132
2007132
2006143
2005111
200491
200369
200291
200166
200073
B

Use grade B

300 to 999 papers from 2021 to 2025.

C

Evidence grade C

At least 2 test-retest papers, 30 reliability or validity papers or 3 registered clinical studies.

Papers on test-retest reliability
0
Papers on reliability or validity
68
Registered clinical studies using it as an outcome
3

Note on the counts: includes theory papers.

How the grades work

Use: A is 1,000 or more papers from 2021 to 2025, B 300 to 999, C 100 to 299, D 30 to 99 and E fewer than 30. Evidence: A means at least 25 papers report its test-retest reliability and at least 25 registered clinical studies use it as an outcome; B, at least 8 test-retest papers, and either 5 registered clinical studies or 150 reliability or validity papers; C, at least 2 test-retest papers, 30 reliability or validity papers or 3 registered clinical studies; D, little published measurement evidence found. The counts measure use. They include every paper that names the task in its title or abstract. Grades describe the published research on this task, not ConductCognition's version of it.

Source: ConductCognition test census 0.14.0, counted 31 October 2026 from OpenAlex and ClinicalTrials.gov.

Task design

The trial sequence as the test runs in ConductCognition.

Partner
One computer program that follows set rules, for the whole game. The standard instructions say so; a neutral wording says only "your partner".
Points
Both cooperate: 3 each. Both defect: 1 each. One defects: 5 for the defector and 0 for the cooperator.
Options
A and B, chosen at the same time. Which letter is cooperation is drawn from the session's seed and saved.
Rounds
20 (standard; 5 to 50) against the same partner. The number is not shown unless a setting shows it.
Partner rule
Tit for tat (standard): cooperates in round 1, then repeats the participant's choice from the round before. Or always cooperate, always defect, or random with a 50% chance of cooperating in each round.
Outcome
Both choices and the points show for 2,000 ms after each round.
Check
One question with feedback before the first round: the points for an outcome drawn from the seed.
Money
Points are hypothetical by default; a setting changes the instruction line to say the study pays.

Axelrod and Hamilton studied strategies for the repeated game in a computer tournament. Here a participant plays one programmed partner for a set number of rounds, not shown by default, and the points are hypothetical unless the study pays.

Quality checks

Each session is marked valid, needs review or invalid, with the reason, before you see its scores.

Scored rows: the scored run's choices in each round. No choice is correct, so accuracy is not judged against chance, and cooperating or defecting in every round is accepted. A wrong comprehension answer is flagged for review. Choices under 200 ms on at least half the rounds invalidate.

Why these rules

There is no correct option to compare with chance, so accuracy is not judged against chance. Cooperating in every round, or defecting in every round, is a strategy, so repeated choices are not checked. A participant who misreads the points may choose the opposite of what they intend, so a wrong comprehension answer is flagged for review and never invalidates. An answer under 200 ms is faster than a simple visual reaction, so it cannot reflect the item. Following response-time effort screening for untimed tests (Wise and Kong 2005), the session is invalid only when at least half the answers are that fast.

No percentile. Scores and quality flags only.

Running this test

Settings you can change

SettingStandardAllowed
Partner strategyTit for tat (standard)Tit for tat (standard), Always cooperate, Always defect, Random: 50% chance of cooperating each round
Rounds205 to 50
Number of rounds shownOffOn or off
Partner wordingA computer program (standard)A computer program (standard), Neutral: your partner
Payment lineHypothetical points (standard)Hypothetical points (standard), The study pays for points

Yearly plans can change settings within these limits. Free and pay-as-you-go studies use the standard settings.

How test settings work

Need a setting this test does not have?

Devices and languages

  • Untimed test: runs on desktops, laptops, tablets and phones. Participant devices
  • Languages: English, Spanish, French, German, Italian, Portuguese (Brazil), Chinese (Simplified) and Japanese.
  • Available on: Every plan, including the free plan.
  • No percentile. Scores and quality flags only. How norms work
  • Recruiting online? See the setup guides for Prolific, Sona Systems, CloudResearch Connect and Qualtrics.

Cite and describe

Methods text, with the standard settings

Participants completed the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma task in a web browser (ConductCognition task version 1.0.0, scoring version 1.0.0; Axelrod R, Hamilton WD, 1981), with the standard settings (partner strategy: Tit for tat; rounds: 20; number of rounds shown: Off; partner wording: A computer program; payment line: Hypothetical points). The main score was cooperation rate (share of rounds in which the participant cooperated).

ConductCognition versions: task version 1.0.0, scoring version 1.0.0. Every export records the versions each session used, for a methods section.

  • Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211(4489), 1390-1396. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7466396
  • Axelrod, R. (1980). Effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(1), 3-25. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200278002400101The computer tournament for the repeated game.
  • Rilling, J. K., Gutman, D. A., Zeh, T. R., Pagnoni, G., Berns, G. S., & Kilts, C. D. (2002). A neural basis for social cooperation. Neuron, 35(2), 395-405. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0896-6273(02)00755-9Mutual cooperation and reward-related brain activity.
  • Dal Bó, P., & Fréchette, G. R. (2011). The evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games: Experimental evidence. American Economic Review, 101(1), 411-429. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.1.411Cooperation in repeated games in the laboratory.

Source papers

  • Axelrod and Hamilton (1981): the iterated prisoner's dilemma and the points used here. Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011): cooperation in repeated games in the laboratory.Paradigm source, Adults

Questions

How long does the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma take?

About 3 to 5 minutes, as listed in the test library.

What device does a participant need?

Untimed test: runs on desktops, laptops, tablets and phones. The browser must be Chrome, Edge, Firefox or Safari.

What scores does it produce?

Cooperation Rate, First-Round Cooperation, Cooperation After Partner Cooperated, Cooperation After Partner Defected, Total Points and Comprehension Check. Each session is also marked valid, needs review or invalid, with the reason.

How widely is the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma used in research?

865 papers from 2021 to 2025 name it in their title or abstract, down 2% compared with 2016 to 2020. That ranks it 30 of 395 test families in the ConductCognition test census (use grade B). Source: ConductCognition test census 0.14.0, counted 31 October 2026 from OpenAlex and ClinicalTrials.gov.

How much reliability evidence does the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma have?

In the published research, 0 papers report its test-retest reliability and 3 registered clinical studies use it as an outcome (evidence grade C in the ConductCognition test census).

Does it report a percentile?

No. Scores and quality flags only.

Which settings can a researcher change?

Partner strategy (Tit for tat (standard), Always cooperate, Always defect, Random: 50% chance of cooperating each round), rounds (5 to 50), number of rounds shown (On or off), partner wording (A computer program (standard), Neutral: your partner) and payment line (Hypothetical points (standard), The study pays for points). Settings can be changed on yearly plans; free and pay-as-you-go studies use the standard settings.

Which languages can participants use?

Participants can take this test in English, Spanish, French, German, Italian, Portuguese (Brazil), Chinese (Simplified) and Japanese. English is on every plan, and the other languages come with yearly plans. Have a native speaker read the machine-translated text before launch.

Is this a clinical test?

No. ConductCognition is for research use only. It runs, scores and exports the test; clinical interpretation is outside the platform.

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